The prospect of recognizing the ultimate is a matter of interpretation. As such, hermeneutics is used as a framework for describing the interactions of self, language, and the other (whether culturally other or ultimately other). Questioning whether religious ultimacy can be recognized across religious boundaries is based on a mistaken assumption that differences between religions are qualitatively different than differences within a religion. Hermeneutically speaking, intra-communal difference and inter-communal difference are of the same kind. If humans can negotiate the former, they can negotiate the latter. Recognizing ultimacy is an intersubjective act of phronēsis, or practical wisdom. As such, it cannot be explained in any detail apart from the concrete particulars of each encounter. Below is an account of recognizing the Ultimate, analyzed into four explanatory ways: its immediate quality (uncanniness), its vehicle (the classic), its cultural-linguistic mechanism (metaphorical appropriation), and its ontological implications (a signifying cosmos). Each way offers a different type of explanation as to how a person can recognize another religion's ultimate. I begin with the most concrete: spontaneous feeling, and work my way to more speculative implications.
separate, but human beliefs and practices are not so neatly divided. Humans live religiously in a continuum of modalities. If any ontological weight is to be given to the term "religion" beyond mere convention, then religion is a tradition-a partial continuity of meaning that is repeated from one human being to the next and from generation to generation. To put it philosophically, the construct of "religion" supervenes on individual persons. Persons are ontologically primary, and religions are categories of convenience projected onto the interrelated drama of human interpretation.1 And because humans learn from one another, religions are always hybrid-the present synthesis of images or actions that were at a previous time not associated.2
In the absence of a non-question-begging authority that defines what counts as "Christian," the essence of a religion is a matter of self-identification. For Lutheran clergy, the belief in the divine Christ is essential for Christian identity, pacifism is arguably optional, and the wearing of buttoned coats is irrelevant. Elders of the Church of the Brethren, on the other hand, believe that pacifism is essential, and abstaining from buttoned coats (which resemble military uniforms) is far from irrelevant. Especially in monotheisms, the dominant metaphor for religion and its institutions are monolithic-the pillar, the rock, the cornerstone. It is helpful to think of religions as nebulae instead.
At the center of the nebula is a region dense with beliefs, practices, and values that enjoy the most consensus. As one moves away from the center, there are more diffuse regions representing ambivalence or apathy as well as outlying pockets of consensus. The regional density of this cloud is continually shifting. For nebular religion, the criteria for assigning centrality to a belief, value, or practice depends not on authority, but on the most concrete and public of criteria-religious persons and their dispositions. Thus, from a historical analysis, the definition of a religion is a matter of convention-demographic, if not democratic. The individual creates the tradition just as much as the tradition creates the individual. The nebula metaphor is particularly apt because nebulae are in motion over time, and they are fuzzy. There may be conceptual overlap where religions intermingle, and the quantity and character of overlap changes as religions evolve. Roman Catholics and tantric Kālīva may be startled to realize they both ritually consume the blood given by the divine, either in Eucharist or as prasad.3 Likewise, Pure Land Buddhism's soteriology of unearned grace may have more in common with Protestant Christianity than it does with Chan Buddhism. The canon of "world religions" does not carve human religiosity at its joints.
Though we should be critical of our sloppy canon, the fuzzy reality that lies beneath the talk of neatly bounded religions is one of the most important conditions for the possibility of transreligious recognition. If the actual nebulae of beliefs and practices do not tally neatly with the canon of world religions, then recognition is never "across a religious boundary." There will undoubtedly be conceptual differences to which careful attention should be paid, but the situation is not qualitatively different from recognizing a superlative in an unfamiliar part of my own tradition. Even though I can barely clap along to a song myself, I can still recognize a talented drummer, even when I've never heard that particular type of drum or genre of music before. This is because there is a background of shared experience of which we are only dimly aware-complexity, speed, syncopation, and timbre. These concepts, like the hallmarks of ultimacy, may not be culturally universal, but they are widespread enough to be described as "transcultural."
Some wisdom is unpredictable
Hermeneutic philosophers have given a couple of different metaphors describing how a person can overcome historical and cultural distance to understand a thing. Hans-Georg Gadamer's chief image was Horizonverschmelzung-the fusion of horizons.4 For Gadamer, the world of my experience is circumscribed by a horizon that delimits the possible meanings I am capable of realizing. This horizon consists of my prejudices, or better, pre-understanding. Pre-understanding includes both conscious and unconscious mental formations, from complex aspirations down to the most basic categories into which my world is divided.
The way in which a text is construed is radically contingent upon the circumstances of the reader's past, the text's creation, and the point at which they intersect. When encountering a text,5 the text appears as if it is another person. It has something to say, and does so in language, with all the idiosyncrasies of a human interlocutor. The "method" for overcoming cultural distance and assigning meaning to symbols employs a disposition that Aristotle calls phronēsis or "practical wisdom."6 Phronēsis is the human talent for adjusting means to ends. It is street smarts-the ability to read a situation and compile the million intangibles into a sound judgment of how to achieve a desired result. Judgments involving phronēsis cannot be prescribed ahead of time, because they rely on data that is not available prior to the actual event of interpretation, and because the relations of data upon which they depend are too complex to predict.
Phronetic judgments are made-successfully and unsuccessfully-whenever we navigate the complexity of social sitations. If my colleague has made a mistake that has inconvenienced me-say she has emailed my supervisor a falsified document-I will need to use phronēsis to decide if and when to confront her. Every opportunity affords a unique set of circumstances. I may enter her office and notice that she is chatting with two students. I will remember that she has reacted badly in the past to being corrected in front of others. I consider that there are no upcoming events that require an immediate confrontation, and I know I tend toward impatience myself. These are only a handful of the literally millions of relevant microcircumstances that are balanced and weighed against each other in a flash to conclude that I should drop the matter and come back later. To the degree that these microcircumstances are navigated toward a happy end, I have successfully displayed phronēsis. I have also experienced times when phronēsis has failed me-the socially awkward, tone-deaf, and unproductive encounters that produce embarrassment or fail to achieve a desired result. Gadamer argues that phronēsis is the most relevant virtue when we assign meaning to texts. Likewise, it is also primarily responsible for recognizing ultimacy in other religions.
If the interpretation of texts is thoroughly phronetic, we cannot develop manuals for correct interpretative method ahead of time. In ideal encounters, Gadamer argues, the reader relinquishes control of the reading, refraining from interrogating the text with anticipated answers in mind.7 To the degree that a text is subjected to a method of analysis, that reader assimilates the text to her own concerns rather than genuinely fusing with the text's otherness.8 Instead of deploying method, the logic of question and answer should be allowed to play out, as the concerns of the reader-horizon and the matter of the texthorizon phronetically autonegotiate, and the meaning of the text is figured. Paul Ricoeur adds that prior critical readings are held in abeyance and the text is allowed to "unrealize" the reader's self and offer "imaginative variations of the ego."9 That is, there is a meshing of the possible meanings to which the reader is susceptible, and the possible meaning which the structure of the text may offer. Every event of interpretation is a collapse of ambiguity into a singular understood meaning. This individualized meaning shifts and enlarges the horizon of the reader, who moves on to another text, receptive to new possibilities.
Gadamer's account of interpretation is not perfect-it perhaps leaves too little agency to the reader, underappreciates critical method, and focuses too much on historical difference, neglecting cultural difference. Nevertheless, his opposition of method to the manifestation of truth reflects the way that ultimacy is frequently recognized: without warning, unlooked for, and out of nowhere. Ricoeur's revisions to Gadamer emphasize personal transformation and the possibility of liberation from oppressive traditions.
Together, Gadamer and Ricoeur give us a model in which the ultimate could, in principle, be recognized. But the question remains: how can I recognize the ultimate?
The circumstances that lead to recognition are infinite in variety. Nevertheless, historically, some phenomena correlate heavily with revelatory moments. Below is an account of recognizing the ultimate, analyzed into four components: its immediate quality (uncanniness), its vehicle (the classic), its culturallinguistic mechanism (metaphorical appropriation), and its ontological implications (a signifying cosmos). Each offers a different type of explanation as to how a person can recognize another religion's ultimate. I begin with the most specific and concrete: a spontaneous feeling, and work my way to more general implications.
First way: the uncanny
Recognition of ultimacy, at its most immediate level, is a phenomenological question. What is the quality of the experience of this recognition? Though many types of feeling can be evoked by the Ultimate, a feeling of uncanniness is common. Freud's famous essay on uncanniness explores the ambivalence in the German term: unheimlich. Heim is the home, and so that which is heimlich is familiar, but it is also private or hidden. Things in the home are those not on display to the neighbors. The unheimlich then is both that which is unfamiliar (not-at-home), and that which is no longer hidden (not-in-home).10 The juxtaposition of unfamiliarity and disclosure is a concern in modern animation. Media critics refer to an "uncanny valley," which appears when we graph the emotional response to an object in correlation with its resemblance to the human form. As objects are made more anthropomorphic, they become more unsettling, until they become so close to human that they no longer provoke unease in the viewer. SpongeBob Squarepants, a popular anthropomorphic cartoon sponge, does not normally produce feelings of anxiety in viewers-he is too outlandish to be taken seriously. He lies to the left of the uncanny valley. Likewise, an ultrarealist's painting that perfectly mimics the human face is not too troubling. The portrait is to the right of the uncanny valley. But imagine instead a ventriloquist's dummy with a biomechanical face that when still, closely resembles a human face. When this face's motors are activated, its cheeks and lips twitch in a crude approximation of facial expressions. The dead eyes jerk to and fro, but only along two axes, and the eyelids remain still even when the lips smile. Many people find this sort of image to be profoundly unsettling, though they may not be able to articulate why. This is the floor of the uncanny valley, where the tension between familiarity and unfamiliarity is greatest. For many people, recognition of the ultimate evokes a similar emotion: the uncanniness of the sacred.
Freud predictably interprets the at-home-yet-not-at-home emotion to be caused by the resurfacing of images previously repressed into the unconscious, e.g., childhood trauma or a mother's genitals.11 But it may also be that the uncanny is a form of anamnesis that is not the result of repression, but simply hermeneutical finitude-a recalling of truths that were until now obscured by the reader's prejudgments. Alfred North Whitehead describes consciousness with a classic light metaphor: "Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension."12 Much of what can be known lies unexamined in consciousness. The act of interpreting a text refocuses consciousness, calling the dim apprehensions into question, which challenges our prejudices, but may also destroy our sense of being at home in the world. Recognizing ultimacy in other religions does not require one to make a leap out of their own perspective into an alien landscape. The uncanny is not what is unknowable, but what is knowable-yet-obscured.
H. P. Lovecraft, writer of "weird fiction," built a career out of his ability to evoke the uncanny. In the opening passage of his most famous short story, his narrator describes consciousness much as Whitehead does (if Whitehead had been on the verge of a nervous breakdown):
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of disassociated knowledge will open such terrifying vistas of reality and of our frightful positions within, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age.13
It is tempting to read this passage as mysterium tremendum. But I cannot interpret mystery directly. To do so would require the impossible task of leaving my finitude behind to take a peek at what lies on the other side of my horizon. It is precisely because the ultimate is translated into my own language that I am able to understand it. Graham Harman notes that despite Lovecraft's talk of black seas of infinity, "the terror of Lovecraft is not a noumenal horror, but a horror of phenomenology. Humans cease to be masters in their own house."14 The uncanny emerges from the conjunction of previously disjoined meanings already enclosed within a single horizon, and not the penetration of a horizon by an indigestible alien presence.
Locating the uncanny in language rather than beyond language is important. It shows that comprehending the other-whether Krishna, the Dao, or metta-is not an act that defies hermeneutical principles, but is their chief exemplification. Recognizing ultimacy via the uncanny does not require an impossible leap outside of one's own horizon. It occurs as the unsettling experience of feeling not-at-home in the home that is my interpretive horizon.
Though Harman goes on to read Lovecraft as an example of his object-oriented realism of the weird, Lovecraft may just as easily be read as a phenomeno-theology of the weird.15 As I read a religious text, the unknown-whether transcendent or culturally estranged-dribbles into my understanding clothed in language that is already comprehensible.16 For Lovecraft, the uncanny signals cosmic horror. But the uncanny may, in other circumstances, signal revelation. The uncanny may be the thumbprint of an ultimate.
Second way: the transreligious classic
David Tracy, building on Gadamer's interpretation theory, correlates the feeling of the uncanny with certain "texts, events, images, persons, rituals, and symbols which are assumed to disclose permanent possibilities of meaning. . ."17 These fixtures of aletheia are "classics." I can detect a classic by the quality of the reaction it provokes. The experience is startling, inspiring, or disruptive. One of the most commonly used descriptions of these encounters is not an entirely pleasant one-the uncanny, but other types of reactions are possible. Some texts are peculiarly potent, and they continue to startle and haunt generation after generation of readers. This disclosure is preceded by a loss of self-consciousness, then experienced as a "claim to attention, a vexing, a provocation exerted on the subject."18 Now, religious ultimacy may be recognized in a classic, but I can also find ultimacy recognized in texts that are not classic, i.e., in the ephemeral. And there are classics, like the Beatles' White Album that disclose truths that are arguably not ultimate.
Nevertheless, the recognition of the classic seems to occur even with a great cultural difference between author and reader. If a classical text can mediate truth for different generations within a single culture, could there not also be classical texts that mediate truth for readers from a breadth of cultural situations? Classics like the Handel's Messiah, the Qur'an, or the Leshan Giant Buddha are common vectors for recognition of the ultimate for rather different audiences in their respective traditions. If a classic mediates truth across historical differences, it should also mediate truth across contemporaneous cultural differences. The religious classic is always already a transreligious classic. 
Third way: appropriative metaphor
So far, I have proposed that recognizing another religion's ultimate is normally a problem of interpretation. The Ultimate could be recognized in a classic text, which is able to mediate truths to a wide variety of audiences. Likewise, when the ultimate is encountered, the experience could be recognized by its uncanniness. But I need to account for how the unknown comes to enter into my horizon in the first place. How does it become clothed in my language? If the ultimate is too scantily clad in familiar language, then it finds no purchase with my understanding, and I am left dumbfounded or blind to its presence. If the ultimate is suffocated with familiar possibilities, then no otherness remains. I have only assimilated the other to my prejudices. But both of these unhappy possibilities-dumbfounding and assimilation-are red herrings. They happen with relatively low frequency.
Everyone learns. Learning is interpretation that broadens a person's horizons. This is the basic fact that makes education possible. At one time in infancy, all concepts were beyond my horizon. The fact that human understanding develops beyond infancy shows that interpretation produces genuinely novel content, transforming my horizon. Every text adds something new. The hypothesis that a person can only understand what already fits in their conceptual scheme is implausible. How could the growth from childhood to adulthood occur otherwise? Because we can learn from our environment, we know that genuinely novel content is somehow able to ingress.
The second red herring is the worry that all understanding is assimilation. Perhaps when I learn something new, it does not transform me, but I transform it. This does happen occasionally, especially at the beginning of a reading. In my religion classes, a students might wonder, "Nirvana? Isn't that the Buddhist heaven?" As a first stab at understanding, it is not the worst comparison, but it is hardly sufficient. It may take a week or two to flesh out the context, but the students build a richer concept than "Buddhist heaven." Sometimes the inability to adopt a new category is persistent. A friend's mother would serve us "Mexi-rollem-ups" because she was never able to appropriate the conceptual category of "taco," despite living in Texas for decades. But this was funny to us precisely because persistent cultural incompetence is so unusual. If Mexi-roll-em-ups were the norm, then all interreligious dialogue would result in misunderstanding at best, and violent suppression of difference in the worst cases. And terrible violence does happen when the good faith of interreligious understanding is abandoned, as current events continue to demonstrate. But for good faith attempts to understand the other, some degree of understanding is the norm. And this is because understanding does not run on a binary code of "understood / misunderstood" or "success / failure." Rather, understanding, and language in general uses metaphorical reasoning, which holds a tension between sameness and difference without reducing one to the other.
A metaphor is a powerful arrangement of language that reclassifies the name of a thing from a literal denotation to a figurative denotation for the sake of drawing attention to a resemblance. "That test was a bear." The naming of the test as "bear" indicates a partial resemblance between the test taken and a large ursine mammal. And the predication exceeds the sum total of literal and figurative meaning. For one, the tension between the identity (test is bear) and disidentity (test is not bear) evokes unique meaning that cannot be reduced to a simple predicate. The interaction between the literal meaning (ursine mammal) and figurative meaning ("intimidating large thing") creates a third level of meaning. The interaction between tenor ("test") and vehicle ("bear") creates a fourth. The interaction between the third and fourth dimensions creates a fifth.19 The result is that this simple metaphor has a most complex valence of implicit meanings, only a portion of which can be realized by the reader. The ambiguity and multiplicity breaks up the binary logic and allows indeterminacies to come to consciousness: ideas that are half-formed, intuitions that are more emotive than cognitive, and bundles of language that are vaguely defined.
The mind's most basic operations are metaphorical, and this indeterminacy of metaphor allows concepts to move into my horizon even when they do not strictly belong. That is, metaphorical reasoning allows humans to appropriate genuinely novel possibilities. Consider, "That test was a bear." When read literally, "test-as-large-ursine-mammal," is absurd. The reader stops, confronted with meaning that cannot be figured into her horizon, given her preunderstanding of tests and bears. In response to the problem, she takes a guess at the meaning. The reader uses phronēsis to select some resemblances that may fit with her preunderstanding of bears and tests. Perhaps she is not very phronetic. Test-ashibernating. No, absurdity again. Test-as-metabolically-variable. Nope, that's the wrong track, maybe the resemblance is less biological. Test-as-intimidating. That makes sense. Perhaps there are other resemblances. Test-as-large. Large-as-long-in-duration. Test-as-large-intimidating-opponent. A metaphor is fleshed out dialectically, as a sentence is interpreted again and again. Some guesses are validated and some are discarded as nonsense.
Some metaphors unfold squarely in our horizon-they belong to the culture in which I was raised: "I was sandwiched between a rock and a hard place." My intent is not to convey anything about rocks or sandwiches. Similarly, a "table leg" is a metaphor that is so commonplace that its disidentity has been forgotten. The metaphor is dead. The leg is just what we call the support of a table. Other metaphors occur on the edges of our horizon as a way of learning something new. These metaphors facilitate the process of appropriation-the means by which meanings from outside the horizon are brought into the horizon. Take the earlier example, "Nirvana is Buddhist heaven." This metaphor is a good start as long as it is presented as metaphor, and not simple identification. I might then supplement it with "Nirvana is the destination of a journey," and "Nirvana is extinguishing a flame." Though nirvana is something initially alien to the student's horizon, the valences of these metaphors intersect and converge on a meaning. The student's understanding creates its own metaphors as well, always seeking dis/identity relations between a new thing to a thing known, always maintaining the tension between is and is-not, which holds simple identification in abeyance so that new possibilities may emerge. Eventually, the provisional meanings are analyzed and collapse into a single meaning. In this moment, the text is made relevant, i.e., applied to the world in a referential moment. Guess, validate, apply, repeat.
The word "appropriation" has earned a negative connotation in the last few decades, due primarily to cultural appropriation, e.g., Europeans wearing Native American headdresses for the sake of novelty, or an icon of the Buddha decorating non-Buddhist homes. There may be good reasons to be critical of these frequently clumsy appropriations, but abstracted from power relations, appropriation is pervasive and usually innocuous. We appropriate culture when we enjoy a friend's book recommendation, imitate a certain dance step, learn a new language, or experiment with a new cuisine. Appropriation is the conduit by which alien texts are made familiar, and by which the reader is made more alien. But appropriative metaphors are not a special technique deployed only in difficult circumstances. They are the most basic operation of the human understanding.20 All knowing, seeing, perceiving, and reading is composed of countless tiny metaphors that incrementally subvert the reader's conceptual scheme.
Fourth way: the signifying cosmos
Until now, the discussion of recognition has remained "in language." Classics use language to disclose truth. The uncanny is an irreconcilable mismatch in our linguistic horizon. Metaphors coax the other into language. But if the reports of mystics and saints are to be believed, the most intimate and transformative recognitions occur beyond language. Is such a thing possible? Gadamer denies it. He argues that all "being that can be understood is language," and "language is the language of reason itself."21 That is to say, for an idea to be determinate at all is for it to be fixed in language, assigned to words, which figure it in a particular way. Truth cannot exist beyond language. In fact, Gadamer proposes there is no world-initself beyond language, only an "ideal goal of an infinite task of progressive determination."22 If Gadamer is right, we are at a quandary as to what to do with all accounts that the ultimate is recognized in a mode beyond or before language. Perhaps the ultimate may be encountered in two modes: either in language or at the limits of language. But if the latter occurs, how exactly does a person interact with stuff beyond the pale, i.e. content that defies language and cannot be understood?
The majority of texts read from day-to-day are fairly mundane. They offer new information that, at best rearranges the furniture within our horizon. The government imposed new tariffs today. Limiting screen time is beneficial in children under 6 years of age. But Tracy insists that classics, especially the religious classic, occur at the limiting horizon of what the understanding can digest.23 The limit divides what is possible to understand from what is impossible. Death, guilt, love, cosmic purpose-these are experiences (and words) found within-limit to express realities that are beyond-limit. In one sense, the realities that lie beyond-limit, whatever they may be, are not fully available for us to understand. On the other hand, realities beyond-limit are not yet clothed in language and so are public: present to all, regardless of horizon. It is a reasonable hypothesis, given the phenomenological accounts of religious experience, that all human beings are united by their situation in pre-linguistic realities, formless though they may be. Any one person may misunderstand the death rituals of this religion or that religion, but regardless of religion, all humans are subject to death. That ineffable limit circumscribes a reality that, while experienced differently, has a common source.
Paul Ricoeur resists Gadamer's "reign of language," and points out that every symbol is the juxtaposition of two universes: one linguistic, the other non-linguistic.24 The former is contingent upon the latter. The soil corresponds to the womb, rain to semen, sun to sight. There are natural resemblances that may be experienced in modes other than language, and this capacity of the cosmos to signify is the precondition of language. Even though Gadamer claims that being that can be understood must be language, Ricoeur counters that some portion of every symbol is never brought fully into language, and thus animates our fanatasies, intuitions, and poetic impulses. As a result, "language only captures the foam on the surface of life." 25 Beneath the foam, experiences straddle the limiting horizon of what is linguistically determined. Insofar as these experiences are fixed in language, they are available to a limited audience of those who have some facility with the same language. But insofar as these experiences resist being fixed in language, they may compel anyone who encounters them. Here we come closest to leaving hermeneutics behind. We have taken the phenomenology of language, text, otherness and metaphor, and made a speculative leap to some form of minimal metaphysics. Perhaps we may postulate a cosmos that signifies independently of any human perceiver. If so, we may argue that our indescribable experiences, the ones that defy language, are nevertheless based in a common reality.
Should we even pursue transreligious recognition?
I have argued that though transreligious recognition happens, no method for achieving it can be prescribed ahead of time. The form and content of that recognition is radically contingent on the particularity of the event. Despite this slipperiness, classical texts, experiences of the uncanny, appropriative metaphors, and pre-linguistic signification explain how transreligious recognition is possible.
But if transreligious recognition is a possibility, should we pursue it? There are valid concerns raised by postcolonial and decolonial thinkers about distorting or suppressing the otherness of the other. One response to these concerns has been to argue that religions are incommensurable-they cannot meaningfully engage each other without one of the two being assimilated to the logic of the other.26 The worry is that explaining nirvana in Christian terms may make nirvana matter to the Christian, but it will always distort nirvana, making-at best-a farce of Buddhism, and the consequences could be much worse when the farce becomes the basis for political policy. 3. To change the meaning of a religion is to do violence to the religion. 4. We should avoid doing violence to religions. 5. Therefore, we should avoid transreligious engagement as much as possible.
The first two premises are true. I will not defend them here, but they are uncontroversial in the tradition of hermeneutics, which places all human understanding under the umbrella of intepretation. Premises 3 and 4 however, are false. First, let us consider premise 3: changing the meaning of something does violence to it. Not all change is violence, because not all change does harm. In everyday conversation, approximate meanings are good enough. You tell me about a dog you saw, and I interpret your speech to figure an image of a dog in my mind. The dog you perceived and the dog I imagine are no doubt slightly different. Perhaps they are very different. But unless those differences interfere with our ability to communicate, nothing comes of it. And the same goes for interreligious conversations: the Christian's understanding of nirvana cannot help but be slightly twisted, given her minimally-Buddhist background. But nirvana also gets twisted between a Theravada Buddhist and a Mahayana Buddhist. And it gets twisted between siblings in the same Mahayana family. There are multiple nirvanas at play in the Buddhist community, perhaps as many nirvanas as there are Buddhists. Meaning always changes as it is communicated from person to person. It can be changed in benign ways or in harmful ways, but the fact that it changes at all is no cause for concern-it is inevitable.
So, although interpretation always changes religious meaning, it is not always violent. In fact, given the overwhelming amount of twisting that occurs every moment and has done so as long as humans have been capable of understanding, it is plausible to say that most religious interpretation is benign. If interpretation of religion were mostly harmful, then it is unclear which moments in the continual evolution of a religion are the ones we should be protecting. This remains a serious problem for the hermeneutics of religion and for comparative theology. There must be some criteria for better and worse interpretation without simply falling back on the authority of the tradition, whose legitimacy may have been established by coercion rather than persuasion.27 So, premise 4 is only true if by "violence," we mean something more specific than "change." For though there are venerable traditions of behavior and belief replicated from generation to generation, that repetition is always balanced by the novel and idiosyncratic.
I have given some reasons why transreligious pursuit of the ultimate is not inherently destructive. But there are positive reasons that recommend its practice as well. If the structure of human understanding as described by thinkers like Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Tracy is true, then transreligious engagement is crucial. For no person or institution participates in an absolute horizon. Each of us is only able to see a refracted and fragmented picture of the whole. Likewise, the signifying cosmos is present to all in roughly equal degree. There are no "elect" with privileged access to the ultimate. But many hands make light work. The more we are able to push careful inquiry beyond the usual lines in the sand, the more we are able to appropriate, and the eschatological hope is that human beings, by overcoming their fragmentation, may know a more complete picture of reality and achieve a more complete liberation from violence.
